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To what extent do countries' corporate income tax (CIT) rates attract foreign tax bases? What 
are the revenue implications of a unilateral tax reduction when tax bases are internationally 
mobile? These questions are explored using a panel of annual data from 17 OECD countries 
spanning the period 1982 to 2005. We find significant international fiscal externalities in the 
form of CIT-induced resource flows. The magnitude, however, indicates that the extent of 
international corporate tax base mobility is rather modest. Moreover, we find that, on average, 
a unilateral CIT reduction results in a less-than-proportional increase in the CIT base, thus 
reducing CIT revenues. The results are robust across a wide range of specifications and point 
to potential gains from international tax policy coordination. 
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Based on the early theoretical models of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986),
it has been recognized that national authorities are increasingly aected by policy measures in
neighboring countries. The rise in international investment opportunities as well as the growing
role of multinational corporations and their tax planning have placed the spotlight on corpo-
rate income taxation as a strategic instrument used by policymakers to attract mobile capital.
Theoretical models of tax competition predict that countries mutually undercut each others'
tax rates on mobile tax bases in order to avoid an outow of taxable income. As the chart on
the left in gure 1 shows, both the statutory and the eective average corporate income tax
rate (EATR) have declined sharply in a large selection of OECD countries. 1
Fig. 1. Yearly average corporate income tax (CIT) rate, base, and revenue (rev) in 17 OECD countries,
1982-2005. The EATR corresponds to the base case measure in Devereux and Grith (2003). Data
sources: See appendix C.3.
The observed downward trend is often regarded as a reection of governments' mutual re-
sponses to tax reductions. Indeed, for a sample of 21 OECD countries, Devereux et al. (2008)
nd evidence of strategic interaction among governments' CIT policies between 1982 and 1999.
Their approach involves estimating a reaction function, which reects how a given country's tax
1 The countries in question are listed in section 3.
2policy responds to neighboring countries' tax policies. Yet, as Brueckner (2003) rightly points
out, \reliable estimates of reaction-function parameters [...] do not directly reveal the nature of
the behavior underlying the observed interaction". 2 In particular, it is not clear whether the
driving force behind the trend in tax rates is a consequence of tax competition or whether tax
mimicking behavior motivated by yardstick competition (Besley and Case, 1995) is at the heart
of this development. 3 Brueckner (2003) demonstrates that a nonzero slope for a tax reaction
function could reect either of these strategic incentives. In order to address this issue, Devereux
et al. (2008) show that the slope of the tax reaction function parameter is only signicant for
open economies (i.e. those without capital controls in place), which can be seen as an indication
for the existence of tax competition.
This paper goes one logical step backwards and asks the more fundamental question of whether,
as assumed in tax competition models, domestic tax bases do vary with foreign tax rates at
all. More precisely, if governments' budgets are indeed aected by each other's taxes on mobile
resources, we should nd that the domestic tax base is negatively aected by the domestic tax
rate and positively aected by neighboring countries' tax rates. Based on a panel of annual data
from 17 OECD countries spanning the period 1982 to 2005, our results clearly conrm these
predictions. As such, the observed tax rate interdependence among OECD countries, which has
been measured in the form of tax reaction functions in recent empirical papers, can be explained
in part by the existence of scal externalities as stated in classic tax competition theory.
Our work also contributes to the small and controversial body of empirical literature on the
relationship between corporate tax rates and corporate tax revenues. One key result in the
theory of tax competition is that strategic tax setting behavior leads to an equilibrium with
ineciently low tax rates and revenues, and thus to an underprovision of public services. At
rst sight, the data seems to contradict this idea. The chart on the right in gure 1 shows that
between 1982 and 2005 average CIT revenues rose by 52% as a share of GDP and by 41% as
a share of total tax revenues. Obviously, changes in tax revenues depend not only on changes
in tax rates but also on changes in the level of taxable reported income, that is, the tax base.
As shown in the same plot, the average CIT base increased by 147% as a portion of GDP. 4 In
order to assess the extent to which tax competition aects individual countries' tax revenues,
it is necessary to estimate the sensitivity of reported taxable prots to the domestic tax rate,
while controlling for the eects of scal policies pursued in neighboring countries.
2 Grith and Klemm (2004) and Revelli (2005) also discuss this issue.
3 Yet another reason for the trend in falling tax rates, albeit not necessarily related to strategic
interaction, could be the presence of dominant economic thinking (i.e. a \common intellectual trend")
among policymakers, leading to a convergence in economic structures.
4 For a denition of the corporate income tax base measure, refer to section 3.1.
3To our knowledge, only two studies have estimated aggregate CIT base elasticities with respect
to domestic CIT rates. Both focus on a single country. Specically, Gruber and Rauh (2007)
use accounting data of publicly traded US C corporations between 1960 and 2003 and report
an elasticity of of  0:2 for taxable corporate prots with respect to a measure of the domestic
marginal eective CIT rate. Dwenger and Steiner (2008) construct a pseudo-panel from German
corporate tax return micro data and estimate an elasticity of approximately  0:5 for corporate
taxable income with respect to a backward-looking measure of the average eective domestic
CIT rate for the years 1998-2001. Roughly speaking, the common implications of these results
are that a reduction in the domestic tax rate results in a less-than-proportional increase in the
tax base, thus, leading to lower tax revenues.
These estimates are challenged to a certain extent by Clausing (2007), who uses a sample of
29 countries between 1979 and 2002 and reports a revenue-maximizing statutory CIT rate of
33%, implying that tax rate reductions from levels above 33% should, on average, have led to
higher tax revenues. 5
It is worth noting that the studies mentioned so far ignore tax rate externalities across coun-
tries. The economic literature mainly discusses three forms of international tax base mobility,
namely foreign direct investment (e.g. Hines, 1999), foreign portfolio investment (e.g. Desai and
Dharmapala, 2007), and income shifting. Income shifting, in turn, may occur at the domestic
level through the choice of legal form { specically through the choice of incorporation { (e.g.
Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 1995) or at the international level, for example via the manipula-
tion of transfer prices (e.g. Clausing, 2003) or via debt shifting (e.g. Huizinga et al., 2008).
Using sectoral data for a group of OECD countries from 1979 to 1997, Bartelsman and Beetsma
(2003) develop a novel method for isolating the pure eects of tax-induced income shifting by
controlling for the eects of taxes and unobserved productivity on the scale of real economic
activity. They identify considerable international prot shifting and thus conclude that a unilat-
eral reduction in the statutory corporate tax rate leads to an increase in corporate tax revenues.
Yet, as the authors suggest, the reported ndings are likely to overestimate the extent of income
shifting at the aggregate level because their estimates are based only on the manufacturing sec-
tor, which is largely dominated by multinational enterprises (MNEs).
In contrast to Bartelsman and Beetsma, we do not analyze particular sectors nor a particular
channel through which revenue might leak away in the wake of a tax rate increase. Instead, we
take a macro-economic perspective, focusing on the impact of domestic and foreign corporate
income taxation on the aggregate domestic level of corporate taxable prots. Such an approach
5 This result is derived from the estimation of CIT revenues on the domestic statutory CIT rate and
its square, as well as other determinants for the overall economic and corporate activity that serve as
a proxy for the CIT base.
4implicitly accounts for the fact that not all companies have the opportunity to engage in inter-
national activities intended to circumvent higher taxes and allows to draw conclusions on how
tax rate reductions aect governments' budgets. In doing so, we build upon previous work by
Devereux and Grith (2003), Devereux et al. (2002) and Devereux et al. (2008) who develop
various eective CIT rate measures for a large group of OECD countries over the period from
1982 to 2005. Among other important features, these tax rates allow to control for tax base
broadening reforms.
Our baseline estimation results reveal that in the long run a 1% reduction in the eective av-
erage domestic CIT tax rate leads to a 0:7% increase in domestic reported corporate taxable
prots. 6 In an extensive robustness analysis, we show that, depending on the denition of CIT
rates and the econometric specication applied, CIT base elasticities range between  0:6 and
 0:9. We thus conclude that, for the time period 1982 to 2005, CIT rates on average have
not been on the downward-sloping part of the Laer curve. In other words, we do not nd a
negative relation between CIT rates and CIT revenues. Thus, we can conclude that the trend
toward falling CIT rates did not contribute to the rise in the average CIT revenues observed in
OECD countries between 1982 and 2005.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the theoret-
ical background and present the econometric model. In section 3, we describe the data and the
motivation for its use. Section 4 discusses relevant estimation issues. Finally, in section 5 we
present the main results, which are followed by a thorough robustness analysis. We discuss our
conclusions in section 6.
2 The model
2.1 Fiscal externalities
Since the primary purpose of this study consists in empirically identifying the presence and
magnitude of horizontal scal externalities predicted by the classic tax competition theory (e.g.
Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986), we review those aspects of the underlying theory that are
directly relevant to our subject, namely the mechanism by which tax competition aects an
internationally mobile tax base.
The standard model describes a situation in which small and identical countries within a union
6 Expressed in terms of semi-elasticity, this translates into a 1% increase in the CIT base in response
to a 1 percentage point cut in the CIT rate.
5compete for capital by setting their tax rates in a strategic manner. In each country, competitive
rms produce a homogeneous good, whose price is normalized to unity, using internationally
mobile capital and inelastically supplied, immobile labor as inputs. The output is partly in-
tended for private consumption and partly transformed into a public good. Each government in
country i, i = 1;:::;n, maximizes its residents' welfare by independently setting a source-based
tax rate, i, on each unit of capital employed within its jurisdiction in order to nance the
public good. Let ki represent capital per worker in i and f(ki) denote the intensive form of the
production function with the usual properties f0(ki) > 0 and f00(ki) < 0. Prot maximization
by producers implies that the marginal product of capital corresponds to the producer price
of capital, that is, the sum of the interest rate and the tax rate. One central assumption is
that the worldwide level of capital, K, is xed, that is,
Pn
i=1 ki = K, but at the same time
it is mobile across jurisdictions. In eect, perfect capital mobility implies that the arbitrage
behavior of investors results in an equalization of net-of-tax returns across countries. Assuming
a two-country world, the distribution of capital must therefore satisfy
f
0(ki)   i = f
0(kj)   j = ; i 6= j (1)
where  is the net return. Therefore, the national capital stock is a function of a country's own
national tax rate and the tax rate in the neighboring country, that is, ki = k(i;j). Specically,













> 0 i 6= j (3)
Hence, the distribution of the world's capital stock among countries is aected by the tax
policies of all national governments: an increase in the domestic tax rate raises the cost of
capital, leading to a capital outow, while an increase in a neighboring country's tax rate leads
to a higher domestic capital stock.
2.2 Implications for tax revenues
In order to assess how a unilateral change in the tax rate aects a country's tax revenue within
the context of tax competition, it is crucial to use an estimate of the tax sensitivity of the capital
stock, as given by equation (2). Given that the revenues from capital taxation in country i are
















ki, determines the sign of expression
(4): If the capital stock is inelastic with respect to the domestic tax rate ( 1 <  < 0), a
unilateral tax reduction leads to a less-than-proportional increase in the capital stock, and
therefore lower tax revenues; on the other hand, elastic capital implies that a corresponding




















;   1 (5)
2.3 The econometric specication
The empirical setting aims to test the predictions given in equations (2) and (3), namely that a
country's capital stock is negatively inuenced by the domestic capital tax rate and positively
aected by competing countries' tax rates. 7 Moreover, based on the estimated elasticity of the
tax base, we will assess the inuence of domestic tax policy on tax revenues (equation (4)),
while controlling for international scal externalities.
The empirical specication deviates from the theoretical model in two aspects. First, given our
special interest in the driving force behind the trend toward lower CIT rates, we consider only
that part of the capital stock that is subject to domestic corporate income taxation. Hence our
independent variable is the CIT base per capita, it. Second, we specify a dynamic rather than
a static framework in order to account for the persistence of CIT bases as well as the potentially
complex timing of tax payments (cf. section 3.1). This allows us to assess the long-run impact
of tax rate changes on the CIT base, which is likely to deviate from the short-run impact as
rms may not adjust to new policies immediately. We estimate the following tax base equation:
lnit = 0 + lnit 1 + 1lnit + 2lnit + Xitx + Zi + i  + it (6)
7 The econometric specication is related to the approach in Brett and Pinkse (2000) and Buettner
(2003), who investigate tax competition between jurisdictions at the subnational level.
7where the subscripts i and t denote the country dimension i;j = 1;2;:::n and the time dimension
t = 1;2;:::;T, respectively. Our main objective is to assess whether and to what extent the CIT
base depends on the domestic tax rate, it, and all competing countries' tax rates, it, where









n 1; for j 6= i
0; otherwise.
If taxable prots are indeed mobile and attracted by lower CIT rates, a fall in a neighboring
country's tax rate would result in a decrease in the domestic tax base. This should be reected
by a signicantly positive coecient on it. By contrast, the CIT base eect of an increase in
the domestic tax rate, it, is expected to be negative. The tax base as well as both tax rate
variables are employed in logarithmic form, so that the coecients 1 and 2 can be interpreted
as elasticities. Given our specication, the long-run impact of the domestic tax rate on the CIT
base is given by f 1 = 1
1 , while the respective impact of the foreign tax rate is f 2 = 2
1 . 9
In addition to tax rates, we include other country-specic time-varying factors (Xit) that are
likely to inuence the CIT base. These and all other employed variables are discussed in section
3.
Our specication includes unobserved individual eects (Zi) that are specied to be xed
parameters, as we are interested in exploiting the within-country dimension of the data, that
is, the impact of tax rate changes on each country's tax base over time. 10 This is crucial because
any cross-section variability would relate country i's tax base, it, to country j's tax rate, jt,
| a link that is only supposed to be reected by the weighted neighboring countries' tax rate
variable it. Thus, in order to separately identify the impact of the domestic tax rate and the
weighted neighboring countries' tax rate on the domestic CIT base, any cross-section variability
(exploited by the random-eects estimator, for example) is ruled out. Following the same line
of argument, we do not implement time dummies, but instead employ individual country time
8 Since the number of individual tax base elasticities with respect to each neighboring country's tax
rate exceeds the degrees of freedom available, we follow the literature (see e.g. Anselin, 1988; Buettner,
2003; Devereux et al., 2008) and posit a weighting structure of dependence between countries. In the
baseline setting we assume symmetry between all countries and assign equal weights to each competing
country's tax rate (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2008). In the robustness analysis we will deviate from
this assumption and employ another weighting concept frequently employed in the tax competition
literature.
9 For a detailed study on long-run dynamics in panel data, see e.g. Hendry, 1995.
10 We accomplish this by applying the Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator. Details on
the estimation technique are provided in section 4.
8trends to capture unobserved eects varying over time (see e.g. Devereux et al., 2008). 11
3 Variables and sampling data
We use annual data from 1982 to 2005 for a panel of 17 OECD countries for which eective
CIT rate and CIT revenue data is available, namely, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 12 Unfortunately,
we cannot include eastern European countries in our sample because data on CIT revenues is
not available for the time period in question. However, in a robustness check (section 5.2), we
address the presumption that these countries may have inuenced tax competition in western
Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Summary statistics are provided in appendix C.1.
3.1 The dependent variable
The dependent variable is the CIT base, that is, the amount of rms' prots subject to the
nominal CIT rate. Since tax revenues are the product of the eective tax base and the ap-
plicable statutory tax rate, we follow Buettner (2003) and calculate the CIT base by dividing
tax revenues from corporate prots by the relevant statutory tax rate. The revenue data was
retrieved from the OECD's Revenue Statistics and is reported partly on a cash basis and partly
on an accrual basis. According to the cash principle, tax revenues are recorded at the time
at which the tax liability is paid. Since tax liabilities are usually paid with a one-year delay
(Devereux and Klemm, 2004), we specify the tax base as it = CITrevit+1=it when the data is
based on the cash principle. Tax revenues reported on an accrual basis are recorded when the
liability is created. In that case, we dene the tax base as it = CITrevit=it. 13 Despite the
11 Note also that in a setting where equal weights are assigned to each country's tax rate, time dummies
cannot be identied separately (see Devereux et al., 2008).
12 We had to exclude Ireland from our sample because its CIT rate has hardly changed over the
observed time period. Specically, Ireland stands out from the other countries in that it introduced
a low CIT rate in 1981 which remained virtually unchanged thereafter, suggesting that it has not
actively engaged in competition for capital via tax rates. Technically, the low tax rate variability over
time creates collinearity problems within a xed-eects setting. However, we do consider Ireland's tax
rate in the vector of neighboring countries' tax rates throughout all specications in order to control
for its impact on the CIT bases of the remaining 17 countries.
13 Note that by applying a dynamic panel approach, we also account for more complex timing pecu-
liarities of tax payments, such as payments in advance, losses carried forward and refunds.
9fact that the OECD recording system has changed in some countries during the time period
in question, a visual inspection shows that no structural breaks are present in the constructed
tax base series. Moreover, the inclusion of an appropriate dummy variable that controls for the
time of the change in the recording system proves to be insignicant and does not alter our
results.
In line with the theoretical model, we specify the CIT base in per capita terms. Due to several
missing data points for tax revenues, the panel comprises a total of 393 observations.
3.2 The tax rate variable
The independent variable of main interest is the tax rate on corporate prots. In order to capture
the behavioral responses of rms to a country's and its neighbors' tax policies, we employ tax
rate measures which are exclusively based on tax laws rather than implicit tax rates. Since the
latter are basically calculated by dividing revenues from taxes on capital income by a measure
of capital income, that is, the aggregate operating surplus from national accounts data, implicit
tax rates are strongly aected by the business cycle and rarely indicate changes in tax laws
(Devereux and Klemm, 2004). For this reason, we employ the forward-looking eective average
tax rates (EATR) provided by Devereux et al. (2002). This measure captures both instruments
that governments have at their disposal to determine the CIT system, namely the statutory
tax rate and the set of rules that specify the extent to which prots are subject to taxation.
Specically, the EATR depends on the assumptions imposed on a hypothetical investment on
which the legal parameters of the tax system are applied, such as the prot rate, the form of
nance and the type of investment. Importantly, by using the EATR rather than the statutory
tax rate, we rule out the possibility that the coecients 1 and 2 in equation (6) measure
the implications of changes in statutory tax rates while ignoring other alterations in tax code
reforms, such as changes in deduction schemes.
As shown in Devereux and Grith (2003), the EATR covers the full spectrum of eective
taxation from investment projects with very low to very high rates of protability. In the
baseline specication we employ the base case measure dened in Devereux and Grith (2003),
which assumes a hypothetical investment in plant and machinery yielding an economic prot
rate of 10%. 14 However, in section 5.2 we will check the robustness of our results to a wide
scope of denitions of eective taxation, including eective marginal and statutory tax rates.
Note that the latter may also be relevant because changes in statutory tax rates may provide a
14 Additional assumptions: 12.25% true economic depreciation; 10% real interest rate and 3.5% ina-
tion rate. For details, see Devereux and Grith (2003).
10powerful incentive for pure accounting income shifts, which are particularly relevant in the case
of MNEs (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003). In eect, if MNEs are able to exploit all potential
deductions and allowances in each of their aliates, their excess income is taxed at the statutory
tax rate.
3.3 Control variables
In addition to the domestic and foreign CIT rates and the legal parameters of the tax system,
we expect countries' reported prots to be positively determined by the volume of sales and
negatively aected by input costs. Therefore, we add income per capita and real unit labor
costs, denoted by income and rulc, respectively, to our list of regressors. 15 Note that rulc is the
total remuneration (in cash or in kind) payable by an enterprise to an employee in return for
work done and hence includes e.g. social contributions, income taxes, cash allowances, overtime
pay and bonuses. Furthermore, protability is likely to be aected by the business cycle (see e.g.
de Mooij and Nicod eme, 2008), which we control for by including the growth rate of real GDP.
In a recent paper, Fryges and Wagner (2008) demonstrate that exporting has a positive causal
eect on the protability of enterprises in the manufacturing sector. In order to capture this
potential positive eect on prots, we also consider a country's exports of goods and services as
a share of GDP. Moreover, as prots can also increase simply due to an increase in prices, we
include ination as a control variable. Finally, several recent contributions have suggested that
the tax gap between the top personal income tax (PIT) and the CIT rate exerts a signicant
positive eect on the degree of incorporation, thus raising CIT revenue at the expense of PIT
revenue (Mackie-Mason and Gordon, 1997; de Mooij and Nicod eme, 2008). Hence, we will test
whether, all other things being equal, an increase in the top PIT rate has the expected positive
eect on aggregate reported prots.
15 Ideally, one would include a variable measuring the size of the corporate sector. However, reliable
and comparable data reecting the degree of incorporation at the aggregate level is not available.
Nevertheless, given the national account denition of GDP, a decrease in the wage share, ceteris
paribus, implies an increase in operating surplus. Hence the inclusion of real unit labor costs at least
partly captures changes in the size of the corporate sector.
114 Estimation
In order to obtain reliable parameter estimates for the model given in equation (6), three basic
econometric issues have to be considered. First, the empirical setting is a dynamic panel spec-
ication where the autoregressive variable it 1 is potentially endogenous. Second, it follows
from the theoretical model that the domestic CIT base and both CIT rate variables are simul-
taneously determined such that the two variables of main interest,it and it, are expected to
be endogenous as well. Finally, the disturbances are likely to follow a spatial pattern due to
similar geographical conditions in adjacent countries (Brueckner, 2003). This has to be taken
into account in order to obtain correct standard errors. We will consider these issues in turn.
The choice of an adequate estimator for a dynamic panel data specication crucially depends
on the size of the time (T) and cross-section (N) dimensions. While the one-step and two-step
GMM estimators proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) perform quite well in large N and
small T samples, they were found to be a less favorable choice when T increases. In particu-
lar, Judson and Owen (1999) use a Monte Carlo simulation to show that the Least Squares
Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator outperforms the common alternatives in panel data sets
with T=30, as the Nickell bias becomes negligible (Nickell, 1981). 16 However, the question
whether the LSDV estimator is the appropriate choice in our setting (where T=24 and N=17)
cannot be answered in a straightforward manner. This is because the performance of the esti-
mator depends on various other characteristics of the data generating process, such as the size
of the autoregressive parameter, the relative size of T and N, and the degree of unbalancedness.
Furthermore, as we are primarily interested in the long-run estimates, which are non-linear
transformations of the original parameter estimates, we perform a corresponding Monte Carlo
simulation for a long-run parameter of interest in order to ensure that the LSDV estimator does
not suer from a non-negligible bias. Thus, we sample from a distribution that most closely
matches the characteristics of our dataset. For details on the simulation design please refer to
appendix A. The results obtained from 2000 sample draws reveal that the LSDV estimator is
an appropriate choice for our analysis, as the bias turns out to be extremely small, that is,
around 2% of the true value.
A second crucial issue that needs to be addressed is the endogeneity of the CIT rate vari-
ables. One standard method for dealing with this problem is to apply instrumental variables
16 This comparison refers to an unbalanced panel data set where the estimators under considera-
tion are the one-step and two-step GMM estimators proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), the
Anderson-Hsiao (1981) estimator and the LSDV estimator. Moreover, the comparison only refers to
the autoregressive parameter, as the bias of the exogenous regressors was too small to be compared
between the dierent estimators.
12(IV) techniques to exogenize the scal variables in an initial step. Estimates obtained under
IV methods are particularly sensitive to the choice of instruments in that their consistency
depends heavily on the degree of instrument relevance, that is, the correlation between instru-
ments and explanatory variables (see e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997, and Stock and Yogo, 2002).
A commonly used instrument which might explain a large part of the variation is the lag of
the endogenous variable. As the CIT rate is highly persistent, we employ one-year lags of the
domestic and foreign countries' tax rates (see e.g. Buettner, 2003). In addition, we consider
the unemployment rate as a potential instrument for the domestic tax rate, since policymakers
frequently justify tax reduction reforms as a means of attracting physical capital in order to
combat unemployment. Accordingly, a rise in the fraction of jobless residents may strengthen
a government's motivation to lower the corporate tax rate so as to stimulate investment and to
reduce rms' incentives to relocate abroad. Unfortunately, tests for weak instruments are not
available for the case of non-iid errors. We therefore report the rk Wald F-statistic proposed by
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) as the robust analog of the Cragg-Donald statistic and rely on the
rule of thumb proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) that the F-statistic should exceed 10 to
avoid weak identication problems. Employing only the lagged tax rates and the unemployment
rate results in fairly large F-statistics, indicating a high partial correlation. 17 Additionally, we
report the Hansen J-statistic of overidentifying restrictions which indicates that the applied
instruments are uncorrelated with respect to the remainder error in equation 6.
Lastly, we need to address the estimation of standard errors. A Breusch-Pagan LM test (see
e.g. Greene, 2000) rejects the hypothesis of cross-sectional independence between the error
terms. Hence, for the sake of obtaining reliable standard errors, we have to consider the spatial
structure of the innovations. The conventional method of accounting for interdependence in
the errors across individuals involves imposing a spatial covariance structure by means of a
weighting matrix specied a priori (see e.g. Anselin, 1988). However, as we have no informa-
tion on the nature of interactions across space concerning the innovations, we obtain robust
standard errors using bootstrapping techniques. In this way, we control for heteroscedasticity
and contemporaneous correlation of arbitrary form. 18 This method also enables us to calculate
the standard errors of the long-run parameter estimates, where the calculated statistic from
17 Note that in several studies on tax competition various other instruments for tax rates such as
budget decits, lagged population and lagged employment have also been employed. Including these
variables in our list of instruments would cause severe nite sample biases in our two-stage least squares
procedure, as it increases the number of overidentifying restrictions (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2003).
18 Specically, we resample the data set 200 times (random drawing with replacement) and apply the
standard formula for the sample standard deviation given in Hall and Wilson (1991). The formula is





(b i   )2
o1=2
, where b i is the calculated statistic of the ith bootstrap sample, k
equals the number of replications and  = 1
k
P b i.
13the ith bootstrap sample in this case is a ratio of the respective tax rate parameter and the
autoregressive parameter, that is, f 1 = 1




The estimation results reported in table 1 are based on the specication outlined in section 2.3.
Column (1) presents the CIT base elasticities with respect to the domestic and the competing
countries' CIT rates when no control variables are considered. The remaining columns include
the estimation results when the proposed control variables are added one at a time. Note that,
as argued in section 3.2, our specication is estimated using the base case measure of the EATR
dened in Devereux and Grith (2003). Moreover, the coecients presented reect long-run
estimates, that is, a variable's cumulative impact on the CIT base over the entire time period.
In order to get an idea of the short-run tax base elasticities, we report the untransformed esti-
mates of specication (5) in appendix B. At the bottom of table 1 we report the p-values from
Hansen J tests and rk Wald F values, indicating that the instruments in question are exogenous
and do not suer from a weak instrument problem.
As predicted by standard tax competition theory, the CIT base is negatively aected by a
country's own tax rate, , whereas the coecient on the weighted neighboring tax rate, ,
is positive. Hence, the results conrm that corporations clearly undertake eorts to compare
national tax policies and that they react to international tax dierentials. The estimated elas-
ticities are statistically signicant regardless of whether we control for potential inuences on
the CIT base other than tax rates. However, as column (3) reveals, the coecients decrease in
absolute value as we increase the number of regressors, especially when we consider real unit
labor costs as a determinant of corporate prots. In general, a clear picture arises with respect
to the impact of the control variables on the tax base. As expected, income per capita, growth
and exports have a positive eect, whereas labor costs have a negative eect on the national tax
base. Contrary to expectations, the top PIT rate is negatively, though insignicantly, related
to the level of reported prots. Hence, while controlling for CIT rates, we nd that the eect of
the PIT has no apparent impact on incorporation activities { at least not to the extent that it
could inuence reported corporate prots at the aggregate level. Finally, ination is also shown
to be insignicant, which is not surprising given that the rise in prices is likely to be captured
by the individual time trends employed. Consequently, we choose the specication in column
14Table 1
Baseline estimates. Dependent variable: ln CIT base per capita
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln  -1.287 -1.202 -0.710 -0.747 -0.708 -0.694 -0.683
(0.689) (0.481) (0.384) (0.358) (0.349) (0.355) (0.338)
ln  4.968 4.506 2.758 2.195 2.142 2.146 1.994
(2.065) (1.315) (0.924) (0.986) (0.957) (0.971) (1.013)
ln income 0.320 0.353 0.350 0.430 0.427 0.398
(0.068) (0.046) (0.044) (0.063) (0.063) (0.068)
rulc -0.026 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
growth 0.019 0.016 0.016 0.028
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.016)






Constant 1.488 0.428 2.363 1.481 1.707 1.737 1.596
(1.129) (0.700) (0.723) (0.645) (0.609) (0.616) (0.605)
N 361 361 361 361 361 361 361
rk Wald F 67.093 77.077 81.533 78.619 77.141 71.756 71.426
Hansen J 0.484 0.599 0.843 0.590 0.778 0.861 0.847
Signicance levels :  : 10%  : 5%    : 1%
Notes: The estimates presented in columns (1) to (7) are based on a two-step LSDV procedure
where the reported coecients represent long-run results. In each specication, country-xed eects
as well as individual time trends are included. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are
based on bootstrapped samples. The tax rate variables correspond to the base case EATR measure
in Devereux and Grith (2003).
(5) as our preferred estimation, which will serve as a basis for our robustness analysis in section
5.2. Note that country-xed eects and time trends are jointly highly signicant in all models
(not reported).
According to our preferred estimation, the long-run CIT base elasticity with respect to the
domestic CIT rate is  0:71. This value implies that a country's unilateral CIT rate reduction
of 1% boosts its corporate reported prots by 0:71% on average, thus ultimately leading to
a reduction in its CIT revenues. Rephrased in terms of the semi-elasticity of the corporate
tax base, a 1 percentage-point reduction in the CIT rate is associated with an increase in the
corporate tax base by 1%. 19 The coecient on the weighted neighboring countries' tax rate is
2:14. Taken literally, this value reects the average percentage response of a country's tax base
if all 16 neighbors simultaneously increase their tax rates by 1%. In order to obtain an estimate
for the eect of an individual neighboring country j's tax rate on the tax base of country i,
the estimated parameter must be multiplied with the respective weight, i.e., @it=@jt = f 2 !ij
(Brueckner, 2003). Evaluated on the basis of the results reported in column (5), the elasticity
19 The semi-elasticity is obtained by re-estimating our specication and employing tax rate variables
in percentage-points rather than on a lograthmic scale.
15amounts to 2:1420
16 = 0:134. Hence, on average, the impact on a country's tax base due to a
change in any individual neighboring country's tax rate is comparatively modest.
In order to enable a comparison of the relative impact of the explanatory variables on the CIT
base, we calculate standardized coecients which represent the estimated average change in
equal units (i.e. standard deviation units; see e.g. Wooldridge, 2003). In table 2, we report the
transformed coecients for our preferred specication and their corresponding rank, with the
value 1 assigned to the most important variable. Clearly, income per capita dominates as a
determinant of reported prots; this is followed by real unit labor costs, whereas taxes rank
only third. Therefore, we can conclude that a large share of the increase in corporate reported
prots over the last two decades is attributable to the increase in per capita income and the
fall in labor costs.
Table 2
Beta coecients. Dependent variable: ln CIT base per capita
Variable Coe. Rank
ln  -0.167 4
ln  0.325 3
ln income 0.595 1
rulc -0.374 2
growth 0.095 5
ln exports 0.094 6
Calculation based on specication (5) in table 1.
5.2 Robustness analysis and extensions
We now proceed to investigate the robustness of our baseline estimation result reported in
column (5) of table 1 to several important variations. First, we rerun the regression using a
number of dierent CIT rate measures. Second, we use a more complex weighting scheme to
capture the linkages between countries. Thirdly, we address potential sources of endogeneity
concerning the control variables. Fourth, we evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the inclu-
sion and exclusion of countries; a particularly appropriate robustness check is to see whether
we underestimate the magnitude of the tax base elasticities if we ignore the tax policies in
eastern Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Next, we change the nature of competition
by allowing countries to aect each others' tax bases additionally through channels other than
tax policy. Furthermore, we consider whether changing our model specication from a dynamic
to a static setting aects our basic ndings.
Columns (1) to (3) in table 3 present the results when we use dierent CIT rate measures.
Not surprisingly, employing the statutory tax rate yields a higher coecient on the domestic
16tax rate (see column 1). As discussed in section 3.2, the statutory tax rate is only one policy
parameter that governments have at their disposal to aect the burden of taxation. Given the
tax-broadening reforms enacted in most OECD countries, we can safely conclude that the use
of the statutory tax rate gives rise to an omitted variable bias and leads to an overestimation of
the CIT base elasticity with respect to the domestic CIT rate. Nevertheless, the relationships
shown in the baseline model remain similar, the coecients of interest being highly signicant.
Next, we experiment with several alternative denitions of eective CIT rates presented and
discussed in Devereux and Grith (2003). Probably the most salient assumption underlying
the derivation of eective tax rates is the degree of protability of an investment. In eect,
the eective average tax rates developed by Devereux and Grith are weighted averages of the
eective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the statutory tax rate, where the weight attributed to
the latter rises with the assumed protability of the underlying investment project. Intuitively,
the role of allowances decreases with the protability of the real investment. Conveniently, the
eective average tax rates thus cover the full spectrum of eective taxation from the protabil-
ity of a marginal investment that just earns a net rate of return equal to the going interest
rate, in which case the EATR corresponds to the EMTR, to very high rates of protability, in
which case the EATR corresponds to the statutory tax rate. 20 Indeed, as shown in column (2),
assuming a rate of prot of 40% instead of the implied 10% in our baseline regression yields
tax base elasticities very similar in magnitude to those obtained when employing the statutory
tax rate (column (1)). In fact, the estimated coecients on the domestic tax rate range from
 0:10 for investments that earn zero economic rents, where the EMTR applies (see column (3)),
to  0:92 for the most protable investment projects (i.e. innite economic prots), where the
statutory tax rate applies. Interestingly, the coecient on the domestic EMTR is insignicant,
which might be related to the fact that the EMTR has not exhibited a clear trend throughout
all countries. In Italy, for example, the EMTR shows a somewhat erratic development, increas-
ing most of the time. In fact, rerunning the regression without Italy yields a tax base elasticity
with respect to the EMTR of  0:4 which is signicant at the ten percent level. This is close to
the estimate in Gruber and Rauh (2007) who employ a marginal CIT rate and report a CIT
base elasticity of  0:2 for the. In summary, the absolute size of a country's own tax elastic-
ity monotonically increases with the assumed protability and is highly signicant for EATRs
based on prot rates of 10%, 20%, 30% and innity (statutory tax rate). 21 Coming back to
our discussion on the drawbacks of using statutory rather than eective average tax rates, we
conclude that the omitted variable bias mentioned above is decreasing in the protability of a
country's investment projects. On the other hand, as we commented in section 3.2, the statu-
20 For a detailed discussion of the various tax rate measures, please refer to Devereux et al. (2002).
21 For the sake of brevity, we do not report all estimations (all results are available upon request).
17tory tax rate is the relevant indicator for prot shifting since it aects the MNEs' incentives to
reduce their tax burdens by using (for example) accounting techniques and internal pricing to
manipulate their country-specic levels of reported prot without actually changing their levels
of real investment. Hence, another interpretation of the higher coecient on the statutory tax
rate in column (1) is that it might reect the additional impact of such tax avoidance strategies
on a country's tax base.
Let us now turn to the denition of the variable capturing the weighted neighboring countries'
CIT rates. Because of the potential complexity in the linkages that determine the degree of
competition between any two countries, it is not a trivial task to construct a more detailed
weighted neighboring CIT rate vector. In the regressions so far, we have followed core theo-
retical tax competition literature in its assumption of symmetry between all countries, thus
assigning equal weights to each competing country's tax rate. From gravity models, it is well
established that distance plays a major role in determining trade and investment relations
(Navaretti and Venables, 2004). In order to examine whether the choice of weights aects our
qualitative ndings, we redene the neighboring tax rate variable by applying a weighting
scheme based on geographic proximity between countries. The idea is to attribute a weight
to every other individual country's CIT rate on the basis of the extent to which that country
is likely to be perceived as a substitute investment location by corporations. Specically, we
assign higher values to countries that are relatively close in geographical terms by dening the
distance weight, !ij, between some country i and a country j as the inverse of the relative









One possible economic motive for this measure is given by the fact that the costs of transporta-
tion between two countries usually increase along with the distance between them. Moreover,
the availability of investment-relevant information on country-specic characteristics decreases
(or, alternatively, the cost of such information increases) with distance. Therefore, geographical
proximity weights may capture the ease with which corporations can circumvent higher CIT
rates in a particular country by relocating assets to some other country. In order to interpret the
coecient on the weighted neighboring countries' tax rate in terms of averages, the weighting
matrix is row standardized. Column (4) shows that the basic result is not altered. In column
(5) we additionally control for the possibility that corporate prots might aect income per
capita and real unit labor costs.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19Therefore we employ the latter variables in their one-period lagged form, revealing that our
estimation results are not suering from endogeneity problems.
Next, we address a potentially important aspect of tax competition in Europe which is attracting
increasing interest, namely the role of transition countries in eastern Europe. Since eective
tax rate data for these countries is not available, we make use of statutory tax rate data and
augment the uniformly weighted neighboring tax rate variable. Specically, for the period from
1982 to 1994, our variable it corresponds to the denition given in section 2.3, while for the
period where reliable statutory tax rate data for eastern European countries is available, that
is, from 1995 onward, it consists of the uniformly weighted average of 16 western plus 10
eastern European countries. Column (6) demonstrates that our key results still hold. Although
the coecient on the tax rate of neighboring countries appears to be larger than in the base
case estimation, the derived impact on a country's tax base remains virtually unchanged if an
individual competing country increases its tax rate: 3:5
26 = 0:13.
In column (7), we examine the structural stability of our preferred specication if we exclude
non-European countries from the baseline model, specically Australia, Canada, Japan, and
the US. Evidently, even though one might expect evidence of ercer competition among the
European countries, the pooling across continents does not bias our results.
As a further robustness check we examine whether our core relationships are aected if we
deviate from tax competition theory and assume that countries' CIT bases are linked not
only through their scal policies but also through other country-specic variables. Hence, we
augment our basic model by entering all the determinants of a country's CIT base in terms of
spatial lags. Specically, we include growth, per capita income, and real unit labor costs, each
weighted as proposed in section 2.3. The respective variables are denoted by ln income, rulc,
and growth. 23 As column (8) shows, the coecient on the domestic tax rate is not altered
while the coecient on neighboring countries' tax rates is slightly lower. This means that even
if we control for various potential spillover channels working through income and labor costs,
we still obtain the clear result that governments attract foreign tax bases by means of scal
policies.
In an additional check, we estimate a static specication, that is, we exclude the lagged tax
base variable. Although the coecients remain robust as reported in column (9), the elasticities
are somewhat lower. This suggests that by neglecting lasting eects, the static model may
underestimate the sensitivity of the tax base to scal policies.
Finally, for the sake of comparability with some of the studies mentioned in the introduction, in
23 Note that we do not weight the exports variable because it measures the total volume of a coun-
try's exports to all foreign countries, so that the assignment of bilateral weights has no economic
interpretation.
20column (10) we re-estimate our baseline regression while excluding the variable of neighboring
countries' tax rates. The results reveal that the impact of the domestic tax rate on the CIT
base is lower when we ignore international scal externalities. In eect, the magnitude of the
elasticity  0:6, is comparable to that found in Dwenger and Steiner (2008) for German data,
namely  0:5.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In the past two decades, an impressive amount of theoretical literature on tax competition
has emerged. A vast majority of empirical research associated with this topic has focused on
identifying strategic interactions among governments by means of tax reaction functions (see
e.g. Devereux et al., 2008). According to the tax competition theory, tax reaction functions
emerge because tax bases are internationally mobile. Indeed, increasing attention has been
devoted to the measurement of tax base mobility via income shifting between units of MNEs.
By necessity, this requires the use of company-level data, which typically covers only a part of
the economy's corporate sector. As such, predictions about the eect of tax rate changes on tax
revenues cannot be derived. In order to estimate how tax rate reductions aect governments'
budgets, an assessment of the aggregate response of the CIT base to changes in the domestic
and foreign CIT rates is required.
Conceptually, the approach of this paper is guided by two distinct purposes. First, we investigate
whether countries' corporate taxable income is responsive to foreign countries' tax rates { a
prerequisite for the presence of tax competition. Second, we examine how governments aect
their national tax revenues when they unilaterally reduce their tax rates taking into account
that tax bases may be internationally mobile. Do tax revenues rise or fall? This latter aspect is
linked to a large and growing literature devoted to estimating the elasticity of taxable income
with respect to individual income taxes (for a recent and extensive survey see Saez et al., 2009).
As in that literature, the interest in this matter lies in the fact that generally all responses to
taxation are indicative of a dead weight loss. Ideally, the sensitivity of taxable income captures
the sum of individual behavioral responses aimed at reducing the tax burden, including, for
example, spillovers to other tax systems via the choice of incorporation. To the extent that this
is the case, the elasticity of taxable income provides a useful measure of the welfare cost of
taxation and hence is an indicator for the eciency of the tax system.
Our key ndings can be summarized as follows: The estimates strongly support the existence
of scal externalities. Thus we can conrm that the trend toward CIT reduction observed
over the last two and a half decades is indeed related to governments' competition for mobile
21resources via tax rates. The magnitude of scal externalities, however, indicates that the extent
of international corporate tax base mobility is rather modest. To infer the relationship between
CIT rates and revenues, we estimate the sensitivity of reported corporate prots with respect
to domestic CIT rates, while controlling for such international scal linkages. Our estimation
results reveal that in the long run a 1% reduction in the eective average domestic CIT rate
leads to a less-than-proportional increase in the level of domestic reported corporate prots.
Specically, according to our baseline regression, the CIT base elasticity amounts to  0:7,
which is higher in absolute terms but still comparable to the elasticities found in Dwenger and
Steiner (2008) for Germany and in Gruber and Rauh (2007) for the United States { the only
two related country-level studies of which we are aware.
In light of the tax coordination debate, our results suggest that, on average, CIT rates are in
the upward-sloping region of the Laer curve indicating that a simultaneous rise in CIT rates
across countries would, on average, result in a less-than-proportional decrease in the CIT base
and, therefore, higher CIT revenues. An important caveat is that our data set does not allow
us to address distributional issues related to the relative tax burden incurred by dierent types
of corporations in the wake of tax rate changes. We have seen that the CIT base elasticity
with respect to the statutory CIT rate { which is likely to reect the tax burden of highly
protable rms { is close to  1. In other words, a change in the statutory CIT rate has
little impact on the CIT revenue, indicating a substantial response to tax changes. Changes in
the eective corporate tax burden of less protable rms, by contrast, imply weaker tax base
responses, suggesting that they are less able to react to tax changes. Another potential source
of asymmetry not considered in this study arises from country asymmetries (Bucovetsky, 1981
and Wilson, 1981) and the related potential conicts of interest concerning international tax
coordination arrangements. This topic would certainly constitute an interesting eld for future
research.
22Appendix
A Monte Carlo simulation
Our Monte Carlo design closely follows Bruno (2005) who studies approximations of the LSDV
bias in dynamic unbalanced panels. The model of the data generating process for the dependent
variable yit can be denoted as follows
yit =yit 1 + xit + i + itwhere
xit =xit 1 + it (A.1)
The time t = 1;:::;T and cross-section i = 1;:::;N dimensions are xed at T=24 and N=17, and
we drop the last time period in the rst 15 cross-sections to account for the unbalanced structure
of our data sample. The explanatory variable xit is also assumed to depend on its one-period
lag, with the initial observations xi0 and yi0 generated according to the procedure suggested
in Kiviet (1995). 24 The error terms it and it are assumed to be N(0;2
) and N(0;2
) re-
spectively, and the individual xed eects i are generated by assuming i  N(0;2
), where
 = (1 ). The values for the parameters  and  are set according to the LSDV estimates
of our baseline specication for the variables ln it 1 and ln it, that is,  = 0:38 and  = 1:32
(see appendix B for the short-run parameter estimates). The parameter  is set to 0.8 to reect
the high persistence of the tax rate variable it. As Kiviet (1995) points to the importance of the
signal-to-noise ratio of the regression (denoted as 2
s) for the size of the LSDV bias, we present
the results of the Monte Carlo analysis by varying this ratio from 2 to 8. By determining this
value, we ensure that 2
 is uniquely determined. Moreover, we set 2
 equal to one. In table A.1
we report the bias, standard deviation (std) and root mean squared error (rmse) of the long-run
parameter

1  = 2:13. The results reveal that the bias is rather negligible, varying from 1.8%
to 2.9% of the true value, and that the LSDV estimates have very low standard deviations and
attractive mean squared errors.
24 Following Kiviet (1995), the initial observations are kept xed across replications and are generated
in a way that avoids the waste of random numbers. We simulate the data generating process using the
Stata Code written by Bruno (2005) available at http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s453801.html,
who closely follows Kiviet (1995) and Bun and Kiviet (2003).
23Table A.1




s bias std rmse
2 -0.0535 0.1575 0.1663
5 -0.0354 0.1025 0.1084
8 -0.0268 0.0825 0.0867
The results are based on 2,000 replications.
B Short-run results
Table B.1
Dependent variable: CIT base per capita, it, in log
Variable Coe. Std.Error
ln it 1 0.383 0.071
ln  -0.437 0.227
ln  1.323 0.548
ln income 0.265 0.053
rulc -0.012 0.003
growth 0.010 0.006
ln exports 0.272 0.161
Constant 1.054 0.358
Signicance levels: : 10% : 5%   :1%.
First-stage results of spec. (5) in table 1. Standard
errors are based on bootstrapped samples.
24C Descriptive statistics and data sources
Table C.1
Descriptive Statistics, baseline specication
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
between/within
EATR (base case) 0.301 0.064 0.186 0.479 408
0.040/0.050
statutory tax rate 0.403 0.091 0.250 0.627 408
0.052/0.076
CIT base per capita* 1.946 2.262 0.067 27.545 393
1.319/1.865
income per capita* 21.704 9.814 4.382 65.605 408
5.656/8.132
rulc 104.592 7.291 93.430 139.286 408
4.678/5.702
growth 2.406 1.807 -6.244 7.188 408
0.490/1.744
exports 0.317 0.162 0.072 0.862 408
0.160/0.046
in 4.043 4.067 -11.316 24.321 408
2.440/3.305
PIT 0.422 0.193 -0.051 1.005 408
0.169/0.103
population** 46.563 62.785 4.104 296.259 408
64.416/5.230
unemployment 7.355 3.966 0.175 175 24.118 408
3.481/2.073
* in USD thousands, ** in million
Table C.2
Correlation coecients of regressors, baseline specication
ln  ln  ln income rulc growth ln exports in
ln  1.00
ln  0.47 1.00
ln income -0.37 -0.73 1.00
rulc 0.34 0.48 -0.46 1.00
growth -0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.23 1.00
ln exports -0.23 -0.13 0.13 -0.03 -0.03 1.00
in 0.25 0.49 -0.66 0.54 -0.24 -0.19 1.00
ln PIT -0.20 -0.12 0.22 -0.27 0.39 0.75 -0.36
25Table C.3
Measurement and sources of variables
Variable Measure Source
EATR Eective average tax rate on
corporate prots where the
economic rents may vary be-
tween 0% (EMTR), 10% (base
case), 20%, 30% and 40%
Devereux and Grith (2003),
www.ifs.org.uk/publications.
php?publication id=3210
Statrate Statutory tax rate on corpo-
rate prots
Devereux and Grith (2003),
www.ifs.org.uk/publications.
php?publication id=3210
CIT revenues Tax revenues from corporate
prots in current US dollars
OECD Revenue Statistics
(Online database, Vol 2007)
Total tax revenues Total tax revenues in current
US dollars
OECD Revenue Statistics
(Online database, Vol 2007)
CIT base Own calculation: Division of
CIT revenues by the statutory
tax rate as dened in section
3.1
income Gross domestic product in cur-




rulc Real unit labor costs Ameco Online Database, Eu-
ropean Commission
growth Percentage change in real
GDP over the previous year
International Monetary Fund
(IMF)
exports Own calculation: exports of
goods and services divided by
GDP, current prices
Ameco Online Database, Eu-
ropean Commission
in Annual percentage change of
average consumer prices
IMF
PIT Top personal income tax rate,








population Number of country inhabi-
tants
IMF
unemployment Unemployment in percent of
total labor force
IMF
dist Distances between the capitals
in kilometers measured on the
basis of data on latitudes and
longitudes
www.fallingrain.com/world
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